Pentecostal Theology of Freedom for the Postcommunist Era

 “Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith
Christ hath made us free” for “if the Son therefore
shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed”

 

This paper is intended as a part of larger research entitled Theology of the Persecuted Church. It focuses on they way freedom is understood by the underground church and its successor, the postcommunist church after the fall of the Communist regime. In this sense, the research presents the theological view of freedom from the time of postmodern transition in Eastern Europe in retrospect with the times of underground worship and in dialogue with the major modern theologians. The main purpose is to construct an authentic view of freedom in the major areas of the life and ministry of the postcommunist Pentecostal church.

Postcommunist Europe

On his first official visit to West Germany in May 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev informed Chancellor Kohl that the Brezhnev doctrine had been abandoned and Moscow was no longer willing to use force to prevent democratic transformation of its satellite states. At 6:53 p.m. on November 9, 1989, a member of the new East German government gave a press conference to inform that the new East German travel law would be implemented immediately. At the East Berlin Bornholmer Strasse, the people demanded to open the border. At 10:30 p.m. the border was opened.[1] That meant the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.

The unification of one Germany brought the clash of two political extremes within one nation. It brought together two Europes kept apart for half-a-century, a dynamic which introduced the continent to a new set of opportunities among which was the vision for a unified Europe and its realization.

A new set of dilemmas was introduced as well. Among all economical, political, social, cultural and simply human points of diversity, religion remained central for the process through which the European Union was emerging. The official “United in Diversity” (reminding of the American E Pluribus Unum) claimed unification, without mentioning God. The new European constitution announced that Europe draws “inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe.”[2]

For us who lived in the last days of Communist Bulgarian, the fall of the wall was a miracle which the world witnessed. Coming out from the severe Communist persecution and surrounded by the Balkan religious wars, suddenly the country of Bulgaria experienced a time of liberation which gave the start of spiritual revival mobilizing Bulgarian Protestants. In the midst of extreme poverty, due to prolonged economical crisis, this revival became an answer for many. It also provided a sense of liberation, but not in the Western political understanding of democracy and freedom, but rather liberation toward the realization of the Kingdom, a world much higher, much better and in way more realistic than any human ideality. The liberation from sin then turns not only into a social movement, but as a theological conception it provides an alternative to the existing culture thus becoming a reaction against the surrounding context and proposing a new theological model and a new paradigm for life itself based on substantive faith and belief.

 

Freedom of Will

Even when approached theologically, in the Eastern European postcommunist context today, the term freedom of will carries a strong political nuance. For many Eastern European Protestants, freedom characterizes the struggle against the communism regime and the divine motivation to endure it as a calling of faith for the individual and the community.

The years before communist era were characterized with opposition against the historical monopoly of the Eastern Orthodox Church. In this context, the protestant movement in Bulgaria also struggled against spiritual dominion defending the cause of religious freedom and the right of each individual and community to believe and express beliefs.

The hundred years of Bulgarian Protestantism have been accompanied with constant struggle against oppression of conscience and will thus creating a general acceptance of free human will. This has coincided with the theology of the largest and fastest growing Evangelical movements in Bulgaria. In this context, even evangelical churches, like the Baptists, have grown to accept and practice the doctrine of free will.

Based on the political, socioeconomic and purely ecclesial factors, in postcommunist Eastern Europe, the Calvinistic paradigm of predestination and election as practiced in a Western sense are not successful. This is based partially on their new doctrinal presence within the Bulgarian reality and their untested effectiveness through under persecution. It is also natural that they are often qualified in parallel with political and religious oppression, and therefore rejected as divine attributes or actions. If human regimes are oppressive through limiting freedom and consciences, how is God to identify with such regimes and practice the same type of “horrible decree?” On the contrary, in Eastern European Protestant theology, God is seen as a Liberator of human consciences and a desire for freedom.

By no means, is this tension to be confused with a denial of the total authority of God. God remains the electing God in Jesus Christ, but how?[3] Is it through a “horrible decree” or through a personal life-changing experience defined by the Bible? Is it through an oppressive act of lawful but unconditional predetermination which God by His nature is omnipotent to implement, or through an act of supernatural transformation of humanity through divine self-sacrifice?  And does this election barricade every possible human choice? No, as it is obvious in the denial of Peter; but also as seen in his restoration, that every choice of human will is answered by God through unconditional divine love.

Therefore, we experience “the secret of predestination to blessedness,” not in a cause and effect paradigm as Augustine and the Reformers, but rather through preserving its significance by experiencing the love of God.[4] Thus, the human will is freed by the love of God to receive salvation for eternity. The human freedom then is not ignored or oppressed, but on the contrary it is “placed in the context of cosmic drama” where the real bondage is not the one by God, but the one by sin which oppresses the human will and distances it to death. The Gospel, however, proclaims the victory of Christ over these oppressors thus liberating human will to its initial creation state as a gift from God.[5] This theology comes from a concrete experience of God in real life, and the quest to serve and follow God. As theology shows that the truth about God and the truth about ourselves always go together, the experience of God is a constant tension and a dynamic process, rather than blind servanthood to rigid principles that can never fully encompass the divine will. And through this experience of liberation of the human will in order that one may be free to choose salvation through Christ, God establishes His “testament of freedom.”[6]

Freedom from Oppression

As God liberates humanity from sin, He liberates it from sin’s moral and social consequences. Thus, forgiveness of sin presupposes not only the quest for sanctification and perfection after the image of God, but also the struggle against oppression and establishment of social balance. As the above shows, the postcommunist revival in Eastern Europe cannot be explored apart from the contextual political and socioeconomic dynamics. The reason for this is that the Spirit with value before God is a social spirit that makes the expression of the divine liberation the very purpose of the existence of the church.[7]  The practice of this expression challenges the relationship between theology and practice as it questions theology’s epistemological and praxis relationship to the oppressed with whom Christ is crucified.[8]

As in such context, theology is challenged to identify with action, the church must choose between contextualizing and enforcing theology. To choose contextualization is to attempt to relate it to the existing culture thus creating a state of relativism. Such approach is observed in some Asian and Black theology. The danger is to go beyond the boundary pass which theology ceases being theology in action and becomes simply a nominal religious culture. In Eastern Europe, such approach has been long-practiced by the Eastern Orthodox and has unquestionably resulted in nominal religion. The nominality of its expression has been a factor preventing the experience of God, thus denouncing the very reason for the church’s existence. Attempts to restore the Eastern Orthodox “symphony” between church and state have altered the existence of the independent synods which claim the succession of the same historical religious institution.

The second direction, to move toward enforcement of theology after the paradigm proposed by Liberation theology, is quiet a dangerous approach often resulting in armed conflicts. Keeping in mind the historical tension on the Balkans and Bulgaria’s success in undergoing the postcommunist transition without an armed civil conflict, this approach is virtually inapplicable. Therefore, an alternative must be proposed before history itself become oppression.

In this context, a move toward a theology of freedom seems most reasonable. It must purpose to prevent political and socioeconomic oppressions which are already present in various legal and illegal forms in Bulgaria. Such paradigm must also be concerned with intrachurch oppressive tensions which are present both among and within religious denominations, striving especially against such oppressive modes that come from the desire of an oppressed mentality to oppress others.

Such working model of social transformation is presented in Paul’s Epistle to Philemon. An older interpretation of the book explains that Onesimus, a runaway slave, meets Paul in prison, becomes a Christian and is sent by Paul back to his master. A more cotemporary interpretation claims that Onesimus is a slave sent by Philemon to help care for Paul in prison where he converts to Christianity and desires to stay with Paul as a missionary associate.

Regardless of the interpretation of the story plot, the epistle carefully presents a more in-depth set of problems that deal with persecution, imperialism, slavery, mastership, classes, ownership, imprisonment and above all justice. It further makes a more aggressive mood and places the church, represented in the text not merely by masses, but by the very divine appointment of apostolic authority.

The theme of imprisonment as a direct result of persecution is clearly present through the epistle’s plot and more specifically verses 1, 9, 13 where Paul uses the expression “prisoner of Christ” to describe his present status. The expression “prisoner of Christ” carries a sense of belongingness making the phrase different than the sometimes rendered “prisoner for Christ.” While the latter wrong rendering moves the focus toward the purpose of Paul’s imprisonment, the Greek genitive in the phrase “prisoner of Christ” denotes ownership. Although imprisoned in a Roman prison and kept by a Roman guard, Paul denies the Roman Empire ownership of himself, thus claming that he is owned by Christ alone. This is also a denial of the Roman citizenship that has led to this oppressive state of persecution and the recognition of a citizenship in the divine reality of liberation.

Paul’s negation goes a step further, proposing that while the Roman Empire may be authoritative in the temporal context, by no means it is authoritative in the spiritual eternal reality. Having established the temporality of Rome and the eternity of God, Paul denies to the Roman Empire the right to pronounce judgment over social injustice and to establish social status or world order, proposing that no one but the Christian church is the agent divinely designed and supernaturally equipped for these functions. The social injustice of persecution and wrongful imprisonment, the social tensions between classes, the problems within the church and every dilemma presented in the epistle are to be judged by no one but God through his elect. The reality of the situation is that the church is experiencing severe persecuting because the Roman Empire is denying the church social space. Paul, however, denies the reality of such oppressive human system and claims that the church is the one that must deny social space for oppressive structures as the Roman Empire.

The text calls for revolution; not merely, a revolution in the physical violent sense, but a revolution of the mind where human existence and mentality are liberated through Biblical paradigm combined with divine supernatural power to participate in a new spiritual social reality where justice is set by the standard of God. Such a move calls for a new paradigm and for a theology of freedom which creates an anti-culture and an alternative culture to the existing oppressive system. Such idea challenges the church with the claim that Christianity is and should be a scandal and an offence to the world, and not merely a religion but the belief that “Jesus is the most hazardous of all hazards.”[9]

Feast of Freedom or the Bulgarian Easter

Amidst political and socioeconomic crises since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bulgaria has experienced a rebirth of Bulgarian spirituality. Many observers have referred to this restoration process as the rebirth of the Bulgarian Easter, and even which historically has been connected with the unity and power of the Bulgarian nation.

Bulgaria accepted a Christian country in 864 AD under the reign of Kniaz Boris I. A millennium later, in the middle of the 19th century, Bulgaria found itself occupied by the Ottoman Empire and religiously restricted by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchy which dictated the religious expression of the Bulgarian church.

On April 3, 1860, during Easter Sunday service in Constantinople, the Bulgarian bishop Illarion of Makriopol expressed the will of the Bulgarian people by solemnly proclaiming the separation of the Bulgarian church from the patriarchal in Constantinople. The day commemorating the Resurrection of Jesus Christ coincided with the resuscitation of the Bulgarian people. Although, the struggle continued for another decade, under the influence of Russia, Turkey was forced to legally recognize the independence of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. In 1870 a firman of the sultan decreed the establishment of an autonomous Bulgarian church institution.

The connection between the historical Bulgarian Easter and the contemporary rebirth of Bulgarian spirituality has been used in many aspects of the Bulgarian politics and culture at the beginning of the 21^st century. As part of the Eastern Church, Bulgarian orthodox theology pays much more attention to the resurrection rather than to the birth of Christ thus placing its eschatological hope in a future experience rather then a past one. Such dynamic is natural, as the acceptance of Christianity in Bulgaria purposes to bring hope in national politics and communal life. Thus, in an almost historical tradition, the Bulgarian Easter represents the Bulgarian eschatological hope for a supernatural national revival. It also communicates with the sense of liberation from political, economical and religious oppression and a longing for the freedom to live life.

The Bulgarian Easter then provides an alternative to the present moment of tension and straggle in the crucifixion. Similar to Moltmann’s view of the resurrection of Christ, the Bulgarian hope foresees the resurrection of the Bulgarian nation as a divine act of protest against oppression and injustice and as recognition of God’s passion for life.[10] Thus, the resurrection is an alternative not only to the present world, but also to the reality of eternal death.

Death is therefore seen not only as an agent of eternity, but also as an agent of fear, suffering and oppression in the present reality which affects life in all its economical, political, social and even religious aspects. As death diminishes the value of life, the liberating power from Easter often remains ignored. But in order for the church to continue being a church, it must speak as a witness of the resurrection which is impossible without participating in God’s divine liberation which recreates the word to its original state of creation. Thus, the hope of Easter means rebirth of the living hope.

The resurrection hope is an influential factor which directs the life dynamics of the church beyond its walls. Being liberated from sin, the believer desires the liberation of others and claims the right to serve. But true Biblical servanthood cannot exist and therefore does not tolerate oppression, thus becoming a social transformation factor in the midst of oppressive cultures. The resurrected church rebels against the destruction of life and the denial of the right of very human to live. But different than other human systems, the church does not feed off its resistance against oppression. Its source of power is the eschatological hope for the full restoration of life and its eternal continuation in eternity.

A final question must be raised about the pessimistic character of such hope, as traditional evangelical eschatology in Bulgaria has been premillennial and due to its Pentecostal majority clearly pretribulation. Such eschatological views, at large, have been considered to be pessimistic and escapist in nature due to their strong focus on the future. Yet, such determinative presupposition seems inaccurate and much limited in its observation when applied within the postcommunist context where Protestant churches have been greatly involved in the struggle against oppressive regimes and constraining politics even to the point of martyrdom.

It is then natural, that in the underground context of persecution it is unthinkable for the church to identify with the regime in anyway. Actually, such identification is vied by the believers as spiritual treason and cooperation with authority is viewed as backsliding. By no means, however, is such a premillennial eschatological view in this context pessimistic for the church. Neither does the church remain unconcerned with the present reality. On the contrary, through its very act of negation of the right of an oppressive system to dictate reality, the church establishes an alternative culture which is the Kingdom of God. Thus in the midst of persecution and oppression, the church remains in its Biblical boundaries as an agent of the Kingdom of God by providing eschatological hope.

Yes, this eschatological view is escapist, as it promotes eternal separation from the oppressive reality. What other alternative can a persecuted and underground church find to survive and relate to the Biblical image of the ecclesia and at the same time it is clearly concerned with the transformation of the present world as shown above? For while its pessimism concerns the oppressive system of the world, its optimism declares the church as an already-reality in which freedom of sin, death and oppression and eternity with God is celebrated. Therefore, the church itself remains an optimistic reality and optimistic eschatological hope. For, without this hope the tension of life toward future and even life it self will vanish.[11] Without hope for the beyond, we remain in the now for eternity.

Epilogue

Due to its relational and reactional role to historical process, Eastern European postcommunist theology is a new historical and theological event. Yet, as theology of freedom, it relates to other theological approaches internationally. This similarity is enforced by the approaching postmodern era which the Bulgarian nation seems unprepared to understand. In such context, the church and its theology become the agents providing answers to social tensions.

Postcommunist theology provides a point of departure from the oppressive system of the communist regime toward a new social and ecclesial alternative. Such dynamic is by no means new to the Protestant movement in Bulgaria, which has dealt successfully with these same issues even in more severe context of underground existence and persecution. Therefore, the church has proved its commitment to identify with the oppressed through addressing and engaging its experience through the experience of God and its adequate and substantive theological interpretation. Such approach provides an alternative to oppressive system and structures, unquestionably critiques their tools and methods, and rebukes the agents who represent and practice them, thus denying them place in history.

A further concern for developing strategies for social transformation is also strongly present including education, law, politics and economics. These dynamics employ Christians in a common task and motivate the church for further development and implementation in order to connect theology with practice and thus to fulfill the divine calling for church’s role in the processes of restoration of justice and social transformation, both now and eschatologically.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

Anderson, David E. “European Union Debate on Religion in Constitution Continues”

May 26, 2004.

 

Barth, Karl (tr. E.C. Hoskyns), The Epistle to the Romans (Oxford: Oxford University

Press: n/a).

 

Ford, David F. ed., The Modern Theologians (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997).

 

Geffrey B. Kelly & F. Burton Nelson, A Testament to Freedom: The Essential Writings

of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (San Francisco: Harper Publishing House, 1995).

 

Green, Clifford. Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989).

 

Grentz, Stanley J. Theology for the Community of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans

Publishing Company, 1994).

 

Johnson, Ed. Associated Press, June 19, 2004.

 

Moltmann, Jürgen. The Power of the Powerless, (Norwich: SCM Press Ltd., 1983).

 

Taylor, Mark K. Paul Tillich: Theologian of the Boundaries (London: Collins, 1987).

 

[1] The Fall of the Berlin Wall,  http://www.dailysoft.com/berlinwall/history/fall-of-berlinwall.htm June 29, 2004; also Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, The Cold War, Thomas Fleming, The Berlin Wall and Wolfgang Schneider, Leipziger Demotagebuch.

[2] Ed Johnson, Associated Press, June 19, 2004 and David E. Anderson, “European Union Debate on Religion in Constitution Continues” May 26, 2004.

[3] Clifford Green, Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 184.

[4] Karl Barth, (tr. E.C. Hoskyns), The Epistle to the Romans (Oxford: Oxford University Press: n/a),  324.

[5] Stanley J. Grentz, Theology for the Community of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 437.

[6] Geffrey B. Kelly & F. Burton Nelson, A Testament to Freedom: The Essential Writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (San Francisco: Harper Publishing House, 1995).

[7] Green, 106.

[8] David F. Ford, ed., The Modern Theologians (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 369.

[9] Barth, 99.

[10] Jürgen Moltmann, The Power of the Powerless, (Norwich: SCM Press Ltd., 1983).

[11] Mark K. Taylor, Paul Tillich: Theologian of the Boundaries (London: Collins, 1987), 325.

New Socialist Attack on Religious Freedom in Bulgaria

Over 26 years after the fall of the communist regime, the socialists left are reintroducing a new war against Christianity and religious freedom in Bulgaria. Two weeks after the introduction of draconian bill by George Kadiev, imposing full state control over believers and churches, the socialist parliamentary group filed in the registry of the National Assembly on March 14th a broader bill to restrict religious liberty in Bulgaria via government regulations according to which unregistered religions (faith confessions) have no right to:

1. Hold religious meetings;
2. Create and maintain charitable or humanitarian institutions;
3. Write, issue and disseminate religious publications;
4. Have educational establishments;
5. Collect and receive unsanctioned donations;
6. Associate or confide with people and communities at home or abroad on subjects of religion and religious issues.

In practice, the new bill introduces a new form of compulsory registration of believers by the state. The left socialist legislators seek to repeal fundamental human rights enshrined in Bulgaria’s Constitution and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), as follows:

1.  The right to freedom of thought (Art. 9 ECHR and Art. 37 CRB)
2. The right of forming beliefs and the non-obligation to give information about one’s convictions (Art. 38 CRB, Art. 9 ECHR)
3. The right to freedom of conscience and religion (Art. 9 ECHR Art. 37 CRB)
4. Freedom of speech, press and media (Art. 40 CRB)
5. Right of expression (art. 10 ECHR, Art. 39 CRB)
6. Freedom to collect and disseminate information (Art. 41 of the CRB; Art. 10 ECHR)
7. Freedom of assembly indoors without permission from the authorities (Art. 43 of the CRB, Art. 11 ECHR)
8. The right to freedom and confidentiality of correspondence (Art. 34 CRB; cf. Art. 8 ECHR)
9. Revocation of the right to freedom of association (art. 11 ECHR Art. 44 CRB).

In the unfortunate event that this bill passes under the law, it will impose, the already prohibited by the Constitution, obligatory state ideology. It will also violate separation between church and state, according to which the state cannot interfere in the internal life of churches and religious communities. Furthermore, in attempt to limit the freedom of the people, it will impose expressed governance and control of faith, beliefs and personal conviction; thus, endangering fundamental human rights and freedoms inherent to democracy.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM in BULGARIA 2011

Bulgarian nationalists attacked Jehovah’s Witness temple in the port city of Burgas on Palm Sunday, after an “organized protest” turned into a mass brawl in which five members of the faith confession were seriously injured. The Bulgarian Evangelical Alliance immediately issued a declaration against violence based on religious differences and the evangelical churches in the city held a press conference condemning the violent attack as an unacceptable form of protest in a democratic society. While the organizers are being investigated, we ask that you continue to pray for the situation, as we regularly minister in the city and the surrounding areas after watching the video recording below.

The Church in Central Europe: Not Prepared for Freedom

David Machajdik and Juraj Kusnierik

The mid-1980s saw some Christians in some local churches starting to speak about and “do” evangelism. The climate in society was changing. It became possible to share one’s faith in a secular environment. People from a completely atheistic background became Christian. It was not a mass movement, nor was it a “national revival.” The only possible (and still today probably the best) method of evangelism was sharing one’s life—including one’s relationship with God—with friends and relatives. All this was done informally, sometimes secretly. The word “ministry” with its spiritual connotations was as yet unknown.

Then came the revolutionary changes in 1989. Christians “went public.” The first (and at the same time the last) big evangelistic events took place. Famous evangelists visited Eastern and Central European capitals. Mission organizations supported by local churches started to do “street evangelism.” Religion was given air time on radio and television. Foreign missionaries arrived. It was only natural to expect a great growth in the church. However, this growth has not taken place. People see the church as important and as a useful component of society, but they themselves do not want to be under its influence. After the initial enthusiasm was over, the church somehow “faded out.” It is still there; it is surviving, but not growing very much.* The reasons are many. We are able to perceive and comment on only some of them.

The Church was surprised by the complexity of the free world. After 1989 Christian leaders did not have much to say about issues discussed in society such as nationalism, business ethics, or the role of the state. Even topics frequently discussed by Christians in the West (such as abortion, ethics, social involvement, or education) were new to the church in post-Communist countries. During the first years after the change of regime, leading personalities in the church did not see these issues as important. They thought that preaching the message of personal salvation did not need to take a new context into consideration. The Gospel was thus unintentionally reduced to a set of slogans without any connection with the complex reality of life. Methods learned from nineteenth century revivals did not always work in a post-Communist society.

Gaps in theology were patched up by fervent activism. Only a handful of English or German speaking pastors had limited access to theological literature and even that was more on a popular level. Classical works of systematic and historical theology were not available. There were big and significant gaps in theology as a result of forty years of atheistic socialism. Problems arose when a lack of theological insight was perceived as a virtue. Weakness was called strength. Theology was seen as a useless intellectualism, leading one to confusion. Many activities were going on, but superficiality was often their common denominator. Religious programs on television are easily recognizable by their naiveté, simplicity, superficiality, and cultural weirdness. They are also very boring. They do not usually have much to say to the ordinary skeptical Central European even if he or she is searching for truth and the meaning of life.

The Church in post-Communist countries has been burdened by its unresolved past. The great majority of Christians living under Communism were apolitical. That meant that they did not openly criticize the totalitarian regime in which they lived. They very rarely supported or had any relationships with dissidents. Some church leaders tried, with varying degrees of success, to win more freedom for their churches by a “controlled collaboration” with the Communist regime. An example of this was that some signed statements rejecting the demands voiced by any given dissident movement, even if they were usually convinced that the truth was on the side of the dissidents, in order to gain greater freedom for various ministries in their churches. It is difficult now to judge these acts. The Church has not as yet gone through the process of reflecting on its activities under the Communist regime. It is awkward now to speak about a life of truth, about ethics, or about a radical rejection of evil. It makes it very difficult to react to accusations of compromising behavior on the part of the church and its leaders.

An inferiority complex fostered a small view of God. Many Christians, when they entered the “public arena,” were embarrassed by the questions they were asked. People who did not take Christian assumptions for granted asked questions which Christian activists, whose message was “Jesus is the answer,” were not able to answer. To avoid this embarrassment, they did not give space for dialogue and swept unpleasant questions under the carpet. A strange kind of inferiority complex has developed: those who in theory believe in an omniscient and omnipotent God, those who in theory boldly proclaim that Christianity has all the answers, in practice are afraid of questions. Jesus is viewed as loving, compassionate, and pious. He is not very often seen as the most intelligent person who ever lived.

Evangelical churches remain inaccessible. Like a hangover from the previous regime Evangelical churches remain locked up and fenced in. Only the initiated can find their way around. To outsiders, churches are practically inaccessible. It is no surprise that in some smaller towns or villages strange rumors are spread about bizarre religious rituals which take place behind closed doors. Shortly after the fall of Communism we were putting up posters in the streets of Bratislava, advertising a public evangelistic meeting. A young Gypsy stopped by and asked us about other similar events. He was very much interested, but only until he found out that sexual orgies are not part of the program. For him Evangelical fellowships had that connotation.

The Church is distant from its cultural and social environment. This might be a residue of the fears inherited from the times of Communism, when Christians were afraid of spies and secret police. It could also be based on a subconscious, but often correct, assumption that if they enter into an authentic dialogue with non-Christian fellow citizens, they will not be able to give meaningful answers to their questions. They know Jesus is the answer, but they do not know what the question is. The Church has a tendency to accept the role imposed on it by the expectations of society. It then becomes a social institution, aimed at the development of ethics and charity. It loses sight of its ultimate goal, which alone gives meaning to its existence: to know God as the creator and the one giving meaning and purpose to the whole of life.

Bulgaria: International Religious Freedom Report 2004

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice for some nontraditional religious groups. These restrictions are manifested primarily in a registration process that is selective, slow, and nontransparent. The Government prohibits the public practice of religion by unregistered groups.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, discrimination, harassment, and general public intolerance of some nontraditional religious groups remained an intermittent problem. Concerns about Islamic fundamentalism continued to receive media coverage.

The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom issues with the Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights.

Section I. Religious Demography

The country has a total area of 42,855 square miles, and its population is approximately 7.9 million according to the 2001 census. The National Statistical Institute reported that 82.6 percent of citizens are Orthodox Christians and 12.2 percent are Muslims, while the remainder includes Roman Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Gregorian-Armenian Christians, Uniate Catholics, and others. Official registration of religious organizations with the Government increased 25 percent, from 36 in 2003 to a total of 45 denominations in addition to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) at the end of the reporting period. According to the Sofia Municipal Court, which is responsible for registering all legal entities, including religious denominations, an additional eight denominations were in the process of being registered. Since the court assumed the role of registering religious denominations at the beginning of 2003, all denominations previously registered before the enactment of the 2002 Confessions Act have been reregistered.

Some religious minorities are concentrated geographically. The Rhodope Mountains (along the country’s southern border with Greece) are home to many Muslims, including ethnic Turks, Roma, and “Pomaks” (descendents of Slavic Bulgarians who converted to Islam centuries ago under Ottoman rule). At the western extreme of the Rhodopes, there are greater numbers of Pomaks, and on the eastern end, more ethnic Turks. Muslim ethnic Turks and Roma also live in large numbers in the northeast of the country, primarily in and around the cities of Shumen and Razgrad, as well as along the Black Sea coast. There are comparatively large numbers of Roman Catholics in Plovdiv, Assenovgrad, and in cities along the Danube River. Eastern Rite Catholic communities are located in Sofia and Smolyan. Many members of the country’s small Jewish community live in Sofia, Ruse, and along the Black Sea coast. However, Protestants are dispersed more widely throughout the country. While clear statistics are not available, evangelical Protestant church groups have had particular success in attracting numerous converts from among the ethnic Roma minority, and these churches tend to be the most active denominations in predominantly Roma-inhabited areas.

Although no exact data are available on active participation in formal religious services or rituals, most observers agree that evangelical Protestants tend to participate in religious services more frequently than other religious groups. Members of the country’s Catholic community also are regarded as more likely than members of other faiths to attend religious services regularly.

Missionaries are present in the country, including, for example, representatives of evangelical Protestant churches and more than 100 missionaries from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, some local authorities restricted this right in practice for some nontraditional religious groups. The Constitution designates Orthodox Christianity, represented by the BOC, as the “traditional” religion, and the Government provided financial support to it as well as to several other religious communities perceived as holding historic places in society, such as the Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Jewish faiths.

The 2002 Confessions Act replaced the universally unpopular Communist-created law of 1949. Religious and human rights groups strongly criticized the 2002 law for the preferential treatment given to the BOC and for provisions that appear to take sides in what many saw as an internal Church conflict. Under the 2002 law, all religious groups, with the exception of the BOC, must register with the Sofia Municipal Court before they can practice their beliefs in public. The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC) also expressed concern at the requirement for groups to submit a statement of beliefs when applying for registration or reregistration, stating that this constituted an infringement on their freedom of religion. There were initial fears regarding the exclusive right of Religious Denominations Directorate of the Council of Ministers to give “expert opinions” to the court regarding registration matters; however, in practice the Directorate only provides an opinion upon request by the court. Such opinions have resulted in the rejection of registration for only one denomination, the Achmadi Muslim Organization of the Muslim Achmadi Community. However, all applicants have the right to appeal the denial of registration through the Court of Appeals, where “expert opinions” from other sources can be submitted and taken into account. An appeal by the Achmadi Muslim Organization of the Muslim Achmadi Community currently is pending. Some local branches of nationally registered denominations experienced problems with local authorities who insisted that the branches be registered locally; however, the 2002 Confessions Act does not have any requirement for local registration of denominations.

A Council of Europe review of the 2002 Confessions Act, prepared in early 2003, highlighted that the provisions dealing with the process of registration specify neither the criteria establishing the basis on which the Court should grant registration nor the grounds on which such registration can be withheld. The act also fails to specify the consequences of failure to register as a religious community or outline any recourse if a competent court refuses to grant registration.

In December 2003, a national conference of Muslim leaders convened in Sofia and elected Fikri Sali as the new chief mufti to replace Selim Mehmed; Sali formerly held the position from 1992-94. However, a rival conference was convened by another former chief mufti, Nedim Gendzhev, and selected Ali Hajji Saduk to replace Mehmed. While Sali’s election was confirmed by the Bulgarian Higher Islamic Council, Gendzhev’s conference submitted documentation listing Saduk as the new chief mufti with the Sofia Municipal Court first. A registration controversy has ensued, leaving no legally recognized successor to Mehmed.

According to both a judge from the Sofia Municipal Court and the Religious Denominations Directorate of the Council of Ministers, due to the 2002 Confessions Act’s lack of specific provisions regulating the change in leadership of registered denominations, the Sofia Municipal Court has no authority to decide which of the two elected muftis is Mehmed’s rightful successor. The only option for resolving the controversy is for the two parties to file civil claims in court.

For most registered religious groups there were no restrictions on attendance at religious services or on private religious instruction. A Jewish school, three Islamic schools, the university-level Islamic Higher Institute, a Muslim cultural center, a multidenominational Protestant seminary, and university theological faculties operated freely. Bibles, Korans, and other religious materials in the Bulgarian language were imported or printed freely, and religious publications were produced regularly.

Optional religious education courses are offered in state-run schools. Following the successful introduction of a program to provide optional Islamic education classes in public schools in 2002 using a textbook proposed by the Chief Mufti and approved by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry agreed to assist with funding for such courses during the year. The Ministry announced that approximately 18,000 primary and secondary school students attend religion classes. The Chief Mufti’s office also supports summer Koranic education courses.

Restrictions on Religious Freedom

The Government restricted religious freedom through a registration process that is selective, slow, and nontransparent. The Government prohibits the public practice of religion by groups that are not registered.

The 2002 Confessions Act designates the Bishop of Sofia, currently Patriarch Maksim, as the Patriarch of the BOC. Furthermore, it prohibits any group or person who has broken off from a registered religious group from using the same name or claiming any properties belonging to that group. Effectively, this prohibits members of the so-called “alternative synod,” which has been in conflict with Patriarch Maksim since 1992, from formally registering as the Bulgarian Orthodox Church or from claiming any of the Church property currently under its control.

In July 2002, Stefan Kamberov, a 66-year-old priest associated with the alternative synod, was murdered near the St. Panteleimon Monastery near Dobrinshte. Two suspects were arrested and released on bail of $1,250 (2,000 leva) each. The case was awaiting prosecution following the conclusion of the investigative stage almost 2 years after Kamberov’s murder.

While the observance of religious freedom has improved for some nontraditional groups, some religious groups continued to face limited discrimination and antipathy from some local authorities, despite successfully registering through the Sofia Municipal Court. Article 21 of the 2002 Confessions Act states that nationally registered religions may have local branches according to their statute; however, the act does not require local registration of denominations, although some municipalities have claimed that it does. Local branches have experienced problems with such municipalities; for example, mayors in the towns of Lovech, Troyan and Varakel exceeded their powers by demanding that local branches of religious organizations provide documentation not required by law.

Certain localities like Burgas have been consistently hostile to nontraditional groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses. In the past under the 1949 Religion Law, the Burgas municipal council rejected the registration application of the local branch of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Since the passage of the 2002 Confessions Act, the Burgas municipality maintains that no follow-up registration application has been received from Jehovah’s Witnesses. The locally elected municipal authorities in Burgas, responding to public demonstrations in 2002 against a Jehovah’s Witnesses prayer house being built too close to a public school, used their “public order” powers to stop construction of the prayer house. The Religious Denominations Directorate of the Council of Ministers supported an appeal to the regional authorities. Construction of the building is still pending, partly because the municipality invoked the local ordinance limiting places of worship to religious organizations’ officially registered addresses.

In May 2003, police reportedly prevented the registered International Baptist Church in Sofia from using a privately rented apartment for Bible studies and language classes. The church was forced to abandon its lease and conducted its meetings in various private homes.

Although several municipalities such as Burgas, Plovdiv, Pleven, Gorna Oryahovista, and Stara Zagora previously had passed local ordinances that curtailed religious practices, often in contravention of the Constitution and international law, it does not appear that these ordinances have been strictly enforced.

A number of religious groups recognized that foreign-national missionaries and religious leaders experienced difficulties in obtaining and renewing residence visas in the country due to a 2001 amendment to the Law on Foreign Persons. The revised law has no visa category that explicitly applies to missionaries or religious workers, and rules for other categories of temporary residence visa (such as self-employed or business-owner) have been tightened in ways that seem to make it more difficult for religious workers to qualify. This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that key government institutions have not yet developed implementing regulations or procedures to handle their new responsibilities under the law, despite the new law being in force. Missionaries, therefore, may have to limit the length and purpose of their visits to the 30 days accorded to tourists.

The high school curriculum included a course on religion initiated by the Ministry of Education. The original plan called for a world religion course that avoided endorsing any particular faith; however, members of non-Orthodox religious groups, especially ethnic-Turkish Muslims, maintained that the BOC received privileged coverage in the textbooks. The religion course is optional, and it is not available at all schools.

Following the successful introduction of optional Islamic education courses in 2002 and the expected development of additional courses during the year, there has been some discussion of requiring all students to enroll in a course on religion. Students would have the option of which course they wish to take.

There were no indications that the Government discriminated against members of any religious group in making restitution to previous owners of properties that were nationalized during the communist period. However, NGOs and certain denominations claimed that a number of their properties confiscated under the Communist years have not been returned. For example, the Muslim community claims that at least 17 properties have not been returned. The BOC, Catholic Church, Methodists, Congregationalists, Adventists, and other groups also claim land or buildings in Sofia and other towns. Former Jewish properties have been recovered over the last 10 years, with one exception in downtown Sofia that is pending before the court. A central problem facing claimants is the need to demonstrate that the organization seeking restitution is the organization–or the legitimate successor of the organization–that owned the property prior to September 9, 1944. This is difficult because communist hostility to religion led some groups to hide assets or ownership, and because documents have been destroyed or lost over the years.

The Constitution prohibits the formation of political parties along religious lines.

There were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees.

Forced Religious Conversion

The Constitution prohibits forced religious conversion. There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the United States.

Abuses by Terrorist Organizations

There were no reported abuses targeted at specific religions by terrorist organizations during the period covered by this report.

Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect for Religious Freedom

Despite initial fears that the 2002 Confessions Act would hamper religious organizations’ ability to operate freely, there have been no reports of previously registered entities being refused registration. In fact 15 new religious organizations have registered with the Sofia Municipal Court since 2003.

The legal requirement that groups whose activities have a religious element must register with the Sofia Municipal Court was an obstacle to the activity of some religious groups, such as the Sofia Church of Christ and the Unification Church during the previous reporting period; however, since 2003, 15 new denominations, including the Sofia Church of Christ, have registered with the Sofia Municipal Court, and 8 other denominations had registration applications pending. There were no subsequent reports that the requirement to register with the Sofia Municipal Court was an obstacle to the activity of religious groups during the period covered by this report.

Section III. Societal Attitudes

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, discrimination, harassment, and general public intolerance of some nontraditional religious groups remained an intermittent problem. Strongly held suspicion of evangelical denominations among the populace is widespread and pervasive across the political spectrum and has resulted in discrimination. Often cloaked in a veneer of “patriotism,” mistrust of the religious beliefs of others is common. Such mainstream public pressure for the containment of “foreign religious sects” inevitably influences policymakers. Nevertheless, human rights observers agreed that such discrimination has gradually lessened over the last 5 years as society has appeared to become more accepting of nontraditional religious groups.

Section IV. U.S. Government Policy

The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom issues with the Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. The U.S. Embassy regularly monitors religious freedom in ongoing contacts with government officials, clergy, lay leaders of minority communities, and NGOs. Embassy officers met with Orthodox clergy members, the Chief Mufti and senior Muslim leaders, religious and lay leaders of the Jewish community, and leaders of numerous Protestant denominations. During the period covered by this report, the Embassy remained closely engaged with government, religious officials, and NGOs concerning the 2002 Confessions Act and registration of religious organizations; with various religious groups regarding the restitution of properties; and with Muslim leaders regarding Islamic extremism

Religious Freedom in Postcommunist Bulgaria

“Unity” Established by Force: The Bulgarian Government Raided Freedom of Religion And Democracy

By Viktor Kostov

About a month ago I asked for titles related to freedom of religion and church and state relations in one of the bookstores for legal literature in the Sofia University. The saleswoman, with red-dyed hair and heavy make-up, looked at me as if I were a lower species and literally turned her back to me with the words “I sell only legal literature! All kinds come to this store!” I tried to explain to the lady that the subject I am interested in is actually law of the highest, constitutional order. She answered that she is not even interested in knowing what I have to say and pointed me toward the exit. It may sound unbelievable, but this is a true story.

Also true is the sad realization that ignorance, especially of the arrogant kind and which takes pride in its own self, bears the bitter fruit of a job poorly done. Such are things with church and state relations and freedom of religion and the Law on Religious Confessions in Bulgaria today. The bitter fruit of the hastily put together Religious Law and the disregard for freedom of religion came to a head on July 21, 2004, when the prosecutor’s office raided the so-called “alternative Synod” of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.

“Return of communism,” “unseen aggression,” and “brutal actions” described the situation, by the supporters of the alternative Synod and its leader, in which Orthodox priests where driven away from their temples where they minister. Unfortunately, this aggression was only a matter of time, given the fact that the state, represented by the executive branch and in part by the legislature, took one side in the argument between the two fractions among Orthodox Christians.

Why couldn’t it happen any other way? Because political interests were again radically involved in an internal religious affair. In the new democracy, it turns out, prosecutors are still bound by the law to the extent to which it is interpreted by the ruling political party. The prosecutor’s office is part of the broken-down Bulgarian justice system, in which your chance to predict the development of a legal case, on the basis of the facts and the law, is minimal. The combination of factors, among which is the mood of the young female judge, just out of law school, or of the clerk at the registrar’s desk who patronizes attorneys and calls them “colleagues,” makes the system unpredictable for the regular applicant. Is it possible in this heavy-to-move, hardly working system to conduct a coordinated campaign, in one single night, and in the whole country, unless the prosecutors’ offices have acted by a clear and insistent political order. Inokentii (the alternative Synod patriarch) insists, that the Chief Prosecutor Filchev, has personally gathered and instructed the prosecutors from around the nation how and when to act. The prosecutors’ statements that they just followed the law, engaging the police in the takeover of 250 properties, can sound credible only because of the position of these people. However, if we put two and two together, and look at the picture beyond the dust that the prosecutor’s office is throwing in the public’s eye, it becomes clear that not the law, but a political assignment is what has put the rusty machinery into action.

There are several arguments for this statement:

1. The Bulgarian Law on the Religious Confessions does not enlist special rights for the prosecutor’s office to intervene. In other words—the prosecutor has not read his or her law books or purposefully tries to sway the public—bad in both cases. With this in mind, the statements that the prosecutors, who locked out priests and laypeople from their places of worship, are “just doing what the law says” sounds ridiculous. A reason, for the prosecutor’s office, to intervene in the worship services, interrupt them, drag people out and seal the properties, without giving the slightest concern to the way such actions would effect believers, is in not found in the Religious Law. At the same time, the law upholds guarantees for the protection and the sanctity of the right to freedom of religion. Why didn’t the prosecutor decide to uphold the law in that part, which protects the believer and his beliefs? Why did the prosecutor not think about the damage to be done to the souls of the people, if he/she would seek only for the formal grounds for the execution of the political order? The answer is obvious: the purpose of the prosecutor was to protect himself, and his job, not the law or the citizens. The fulfillment of political assignments by the prosecutor’s office is a bad sign for the return of Soviet-type methodology of state rule.
2. The grounds for action of the prosecutor’s office and the police in Sofia was not the Law on Religious Confessions but a complaint by patriarch Maxim of “intrusion”—the legalese for “someone has settled into another’s property and does not want to leave.” The prosecutors should have had a different approach in this case of “intrusion” alleged by Maxim. This case was not about a domestic dispute, a drunken brawl or the eviction of old renters in favor of the new owner. The case affects the rights and legal interests of people as they relate to the freedom of religion and are protected by the law of highest rank. Ministers and believers in the whole country are affected. The reading of the Law on Religious Confessions, of the constitution of Bulgaria and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ratified by Bulgaria and in effect in Bulgarian law) in this case was mandatory. A careful reading would have made the prosecutor’s office realize the delicate situation it finds itself in –
That it is in danger of violating the constitution, the Convention and even the Law on Religious Confessions, regardless of how bad it is. We all had to listen, instead, to the stubborn assertions that the law was upheld. Unfortunately, it could not have been any other way, because the letter of the law was obviously a good reason not to apply the spirit of the law, which is to do justice based on truth and impartiality.
3. Highly organized effort. The attorney for the alternative Synod, Ivan Gruikin, rightly noted that in its effort against crime, the prosecutors enthusiasm for upholding the law is much less vehement and uncoordinated as opposed to the struggle against the “dangerous” believers and priests (after all, they could say a prayer or conduct a liturgy). A serious effort of the whole state prosecution institution is necessary in order to force priests and worshipers from 250 Orthodox churches and properties from all over the country, only within a few hours, to interrupt their services, expression of faith and fellowship with God. The freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, and the feelings of people in this regard, which are protected not only in the LRC but in the Bulgarian Constitution as well and in the European Convention, were trampled on in a reckless manner.
4. The Directorate “Religious Confessions,” which is with the executive branch of the government, in the face of professor Zhelev, did not intervene to prevent the hasty actions of prosecutors and police. The Directorate has the duty to do that according to LRC (art. 35, para. 7 “observes the upholding of religious rights and freedoms by the responsible state officials” or “observes that officials do not violate the order of religious rights and freedom.” Just to the contrary, Zhelev expressed opinions in favor of the recognized-by-the-state, i.e. the ruling party, synod of patriarch Maxim. His words, quoted in several online news publications were: “Lets hope that the priests (of Inokentii’s synod) will come to their senses and will return into the canon of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.” Such an attitude is an impermissible taking of sides by the state in an argument which the state cannot solve. It only confirms the impression that Zhelev, the prosecutor’s office and the police are working together for one of the parties in this church dispute. The director did not see a problem that worship services are being interrupted, that priests are being dragged to the streets by force, that there are confused, upset and hurt people, who do not really understand what, in the world, is going on. The Directorate “Religious Confessions” called for the return to the true faith, instead. Just like a director should do.

What is the reason for this blatant failure of the post-communist democracy in Bulgaria? The government leaders’ flirtations with the Orthodox Church and that of the Orthodox Church with the government played a bad joke on everyone. Bulgaria has a years old tradition imported first from the Byzantine Empire, then cultivated in a Russian and Soviet fashion, and re-imported from the north. This is the doctrine of “symphony between church and state.” If you ask well-informed Orthodox believers they would object that this is a doctrine that is typical for Eastern Orthodoxy. They would say that the Eastern Orthodox church does not seek recognition from the state. Simultaneously from history and from contemporary events, we see that the Orthodox institution has liked the support of state authority and the reverse, the state authorities have liked the support of the masses secured by the respect shown to the Orthodox church, and this has been a priority in government policy. In this respect, the state needs a united church and the church needs a strong state authority to back it up. At the same time, neither of these is needed in the contemporary free civil society.

The symphony doctrine, however, does not work well in the environment of post-communist democracy aiming at the western European, and to some extent to the American, model of free market and personal freedom. It is impossible for the government to secure the freedom of religious choice if at the same time it is striving to establish a single religious institution as its own political choice. There are two possible models of church-state relations, which are at odds at this very moment in the Bulgarian society. The first model is the one of the Russian-Byzantine practice where state-czar (president)-fatherland-people are one, and anyone, who is not of the Eastern Orthodox confession and does not support the king is a national traitor. This is the model of the historical heritage. The second model allows people to freely believe in God, to associate because of their faith and preach it, while the government guarantees them liberty, as far as they do not commit crimes and do not hurt or kidnap others. This is the model of the contemporary, postmodern civil order of individual freedoms. On the other hand, the Bulgarian model has always strived to the “golden middle”—do unto others so as to always get the benefit yourself. (Something rather different from the Golden Rule of Christ—do unto others as you want them to do unto you.) Therefore, the raid of the state against the Eastern Orthodox church led by Inokentii is an expression of this desire to “have the cake and eat it, too”, of a mechanical blending of Eastern tradition with Western image. This saying does not work in free societies, because in a place where there is freedom of speech and information, narrow-mindedness in a person’s character or in an organization’s philosophy of management cannot pass by unnoticed and unpunished by the public’s opinion. After all, in this case fundamental human rights and freedoms where brutally violated, and the democratic reforms in Bulgaria are being threatened.

From the very beginning, along with many other critics, I maintained that this new Law on Religious Confessions (2003) is a time-bomb, that it was written double-mindedly, with a great dose of opportunism and with a complete lack of understanding of the actual value of this most precious civil liberty of man—to believe in God and to worship Him. Now this time-bomb has started to inflict injuries. The church and state symphony is turning into a chaotic crescendo. If this forceful way, with such disregard for the consequences, was used to treat some of the Eastern Orthodox believers and their leaders, which are a significant part of the religious communist in Bulgaria, what treatment can we expect for the lesser number of Christians from other denominations?

The dispute, as it is put between the two Synods and their supporters, cannot be decided favorably unless one of the rivals loses all. Both groups are fighting for the recognition forcefully put in place by article 10 of the LRC. The text sets the standard that there is only one true Orthodox church in Bulgaria.

A disgruntled and overwhelmed young priest, from Maxim’s group, shown on a news report on TV, gave the solution to the problem—the schismatics had to repent and return into the realm of the true church. And who, actually, is to decide who is a schismatic and who is in the right faith? This dilemma has primarily spiritual dimensions. But because of political appetites and state-inflicted disregard of freedom of conscience and religious liberty, the issue has become a political one: the status of “schismatics” has been granted to the alternative synod by the government and the prime-minister favoring Maxim and his synod.

The solution of the dispute is not in the “repentance”, as a political category, but in repentance as the turning of the heart from selfishness to the what is righteous and true. The question remains: how should people repent if they are not convinced that repentance for them should include submitting themselves to the leadership of a patriarch in whom many see a servant from the former communist regime? At the same time, they have no legal opportunity to register an Eastern Orthodox church of their own—the law states that the Eastern Orthodox church in Bulgaria is only one. Aside from its real estate value, the sealed church properties are also communities of believers, whose souls cannot be emptied by a decree from the prosecutor’s office.

It is sad that this is happening at a time when Bulgaria needs a true resolve as a nation in its trials against war on terror. On the other hand, the conflict between the church and the state is positive since it brings the division and rivalry into the open. It is easy to heal an open wound, even at the price of shame for those who easily resort to force when its not needed. This way of bringing about “unity” is a trademark of terrorists and communists alone. It cannot be applied by the authorities of a democratic nation, as Bulgaria strives to be such. Bulgarian rulers must shake-off their wolf’s appetite to control the faith and the conscience of people and let their disputes hang over their own consciences.

Bulgarian Police Seizures of Church Properties in Conflict with Religious Freedom Commitments Action Inconsistent with Bulgaria’s OSCE Leadership Position

(Washington) – United States Helsinki Commission Chairman Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) expressed alarm today over the widespread seizure of church properties in Bulgaria, which currently serves as Chair-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Bulgarian authorities raided more than 200 properties used by the alternative Bulgarian Orthodox synod for more than 10 years.

“I’m deeply distressed that Bulgarian police, with the apparent approval of the state prosecutor’s office, would forcibly seize some 200 churches and church-owned properties,” declared Chairman Smith. “While there may be disputes within the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, it is certainly not the proper role of government to interfere with internal church affairs. Unfortunately, Bulgarian authorities have abandoned neutrality and chosen sides, potentially endangering religious freedom.”

News reports indicate that throughout the day on July 21 Bulgarian police across the country expelled members of the alternative Orthodox synod of Bishop Inokentii, taking control of properties used by the synod. A longstanding church dispute between the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the alternative synod has existed since they split in 1992.

The raids were discussed with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy, visiting Washington last week in his capacity as Chair-in-Office of the OSCE, in a meeting with Chairman Smith.

“Property issues should be decided by a court, not through legislative fiat or the unilateral actions of a state prosecutor and police,” said Chairman Smith. “Considering that Bulgaria is the current OSCE Chair-in-Office, I urge the Bulgarian Government to end this embarrassment, lead by example, and honor its OSCE human rights commitment toward religious freedom.”

“Bulgarian authorities should stop interfering and reinstate to the alternative synod full control of the properties,” Smith added. “The state should play no role in forcibly reconciling the two Orthodox communities.”

These raids are not the first time that the Bulgarian Government has favored one synod over the other. The December 2002 religion law enumerated detailed characteristics of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, thereby establishing the synod of Patriarch Maxim above the alternative synod and all other religious communities. The law also laid the groundwork for the seizures by vesting government recognition and property rights with only the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. This provision works to the detriment of the alternative synod, placing it in a precarious and vulnerable position. The United States Helsinki Commission issued a report on the religion law, highlighting this problematic provision and other shortcomings.

The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce.

Freedom of Religion Declaration

Declaration of the participants in the “Current Problems of Religious Communities in Bulgaria” Conference held on July 13, 2004 in Sofia
To:
1. President of the Republic of Bulgaria
2. Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of Bulgaria
3. Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria
4. Chief Prosecutor of the Republic of Bulgaria

We, the participants in the “Current Problems of Religious Communities in Bulgaria” Conference held on July 13, 2004 in Sofia, representing religious communities, non-government and social rights organization and citizens, being apprehensive with the attempts of the state to be involved in the internal dynamics of the religious communities and protesting against the tendencies to use the religious problematic for political purposes without taking under considering the numerous protests and objections against the practice of the accepted against our will Confessional Act, in one accord appeal for the applying of the constitutional principles for separation of church and state and for allowing the Bulgarian believers to reach autonomic solutions for the existing problems in their denominations.

We insist for the prosecution of the acts of encroachment on church buildings and the cases of aggression on the pretext of applying the Confessional Act, as well as for the actions purposing the inflaming of religious animosity.

We consider it to be unpredictable and dangerous for society to enforce totalitarian tendencies in the sphere of human rights after fifteen years of democratic changes in Bulgaria and on the verge of the country’s entrance in the family of free European nations.

Bulgaria: Religious Freedom

International Religious Freedom Report 2003
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice for some non-Orthodox religious groups. These restrictions are manifested primarily in a registration process that is selective, slow, and nontransparent. The Government prohibits the public practice of religion by groups that are not registered.
There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report. In December 2002, the Government passed a new law on religion–the Confessions Act. While an improvement over the previous law from 1949, religious and human rights groups have criticized the new law for the preferential treatment given to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and for provisions that appear to take sides in what many see as an internal Church conflict.

The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, discrimination, harassment, and general public intolerance of non-traditional religious minorities remained an intermittent problem. No major incidents were reported during the period covered by this report, and attitudes towards non-traditional groups continued to improve. Tensions between factions within the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and concerns about Islamic fundamentalism continued to receive media coverage.

The U.S. Government raised the issue of religious freedom repeatedly in contacts with government officials and Members of Parliament in the context of its overall dialog of promoting human rights.

Section I. Religious Demography

The country has a total area of 42,855 square miles, and its population is approximately 7.9 million according to a 2001 census. According to the most recent statistics from the country’s National Statistical Institute, approximately 82.6 percent of citizens are Orthodox Christians and approximately 12.2 percent are Muslims, while the remainder includes Roman Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Gregorian-Armenian Christians, Uniate Catholics, and others. Another study used 1998 figures to estimate that 85 percent of the population are Orthodox Christians, 13 percent are Muslims, 1.5 percent are Roman Catholics, 0.8 percent are Jews, and 1 percent are from other religions. A total of 36 denominations are registered officially with the Government, up from 30 in 2002. According to the head of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and Religion, a number of denominations still have pending registration requests with the Sofia Court.

Some religious minorities are concentrated geographically. The Rhodope Mountains (along the country’s southern border with Greece) are home to many Muslims, including ethnic Turks, Roma, and “Pomaks” (descendents of Slavic Bulgarians who converted to Islam centuries ago under Ottoman rule). At the western extreme of the Rhodopes, there are greater numbers of Pomaks, and on the eastern end, more ethnic Turks. Muslim ethnic Turks and Roma also live in large numbers in the northeast of the country, primarily in and around the cities of Shumen and Razgrad, as well as along the Black Sea coast. There are comparatively large numbers of Roman Catholics in Plovdiv, Assenovgrad, and in cities along the Danube River. Eastern Rite Catholic communities are located in Sofia and Smolyan. Many members of the country’s small Jewish community live in Sofia, Ruse, and along the Black Sea coast. However, Protestant groups are dispersed more widely throughout the country. While clear statistics are not available, evangelical Protestant church groups have had particular success in attracting numerous converts from among the ethnic Roma minority, and these churches tend to be the most active denominations in predominantly Roma inhabited areas.

Although no exact data are available on attendance levels, most observers agree that evangelical Protestants tend to participate in religious services more frequently than other religious groups. Members of the country’s Catholic community also are regarded as more likely than members of other faiths to regularly attend religious services.

Missionaries are present in the country, including, for example, representatives of evangelical Protestant churches and more than 100 missionaries from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice for some non-Orthodox religious groups.

The Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the “traditional” religion. The Government provides financial support for the Eastern Orthodox Church, as well as for several other religious communities perceived as holding historic places in society, such as the Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Jewish faiths, which also are considered “traditional.” These groups generally benefit from a relatively high degree of governmental and societal tolerance.

A new law on religion, known as the Confessions Act, was approved by Parliament on December 22, 2002. It entered into force 1 week later, replacing an outdated religion law dating back to 1949. Religious and human rights groups have strongly criticized the law for the preferential treatment given to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and for provisions that appear to take sides in what many see as an internal Church conflict. Under the new law, all religious groups, with the exception of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, must register with the Sofia Municipal Court before they can practice their beliefs in public. The rather broad influence given to the Religious Denominations Directorate of the Council of Ministers, particularly regarding the Directorate’s exclusive right to give “expert opinions” to the Court regarding registration matters, also has been a cause of concern.

Several drafts of the new law were under consideration in late 2002. The Act was adopted before international legal experts and human rights groups had the opportunity to review the final draft to ensure it was consistent with international standards on religious freedom. Upon review following adoption of the law, legal experts and human rights groups found some provisions in the law to be ambiguous or even contradictory. A review prepared in early 2003 for the Council of Europe highlights that the provisions dealing with the process of registration neither specify the criteria establishing the basis on which the Court should grant registration, nor the grounds on which such registration can be withheld. The Act also fails to specify the consequences of failure to register as a religious community or outline any recourse if a competent court refuses to grant registration. Therefore, the actual impact of the new law will depend to a great extent on how the Act is implemented, including the Sofia Municipal Court’s practices regarding registration. There are reports that some groups have encountered undue delays with their re-registration. Since visas are contingent on re-registration, the Missionary Sisters of Charity and the Salesians reportedly have been denied visas.

For most registered religious groups there were no restrictions on attendance at religious services or on private religious instruction. Four Islamic schools (including a university-level Muslim divinity school), a Muslim cultural center, a multi-denominational Protestant seminary, university theological faculties, and religious primary schools operated freely. Bibles and other religious materials in the Bulgarian language were imported or printed freely, and Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish publications were published regularly.

Optional religious education courses are offered in state-run schools. Following the successful introduction of a program to provide optional Islamic education classes in primary schools in 2002 using a textbook proposed by the Chief Mufti and approved by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry agreed to assist with funding for such courses in 2004. The Chief Mufti’s office reports that in 2002 it funded more than 1,000 students participation in the pilot program. The Ministry announced that approximately 18,000 primary and secondary school students attend religion classes. Evangelical groups have expressed concern that other textbooks designed to be used in public schools for religious education are biased in favor of the Orthodox perspective.

The Government generally has encouraged greater religious tolerance since 1998 by seeking to promote greater understanding among different faiths.

Restrictions on Religious Freedom

The Government restricted religious freedom through a registration process that is selective, slow, and nontransparent. The Government prohibits the public practice of religion by groups that are not registered.

The split within the Bulgarian Orthodox Church between those who support Patriarch Maksim and those who view him as illegitimate because he was selected in 1971 under Communist rule to head that church led to tension between the groups and violence in July 2002. The schism, which began in 1992, continued despite attempts by the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha Government to heal the rift. While many Bulgarians viewed the Government as generally favoring the group headed by Maksim, the Government had stayed formally neutral regarding the leadership status of either Maksim’s “Holy Synod” or the so-called “alternative synod.” However, the new law recognizes Patriarch Maksim as the sole representative of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. It furthermore prohibits any group or person who has broken off from a registered religious group from using the same name or claiming any properties belonging to that group. Effectively, this prohibits members of the alternative synod from formally registering as the Bulgarian Orthodox Church or from claiming any of the Church property currently under its control.

On July 22, 2002, Stefan Kamberov, a 66-year-old priest associated with the alternative synod, was murdered near the St. Panteleimon Monastery near Dobrinshte. The two synods were in open conflict regarding the control of the monastery. Two suspects with connections to Maxim’s synod (including one priest) have been arrested in connection with the murder, but the case has not yet been brought to trial.

While the observance of religious freedom has improved for some nontraditional groups, other groups have faced official disfavor and been disadvantaged by the Government’s persistent refusal to grant registration. The legal requirement that groups whose activities have a religious element must register with the Sofia Municipal Court remained an obstacle to the activity of some religious groups, such as the Unification Church and the Sofia Church of Christ. Other church groups have successfully registered through the Court, but continued to face some discrimination and antipathy from many local governments.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses are legally registered, and have been recognized since 1998; however, there have been problems between the Jehovah’s Witnesses and some local authorities. The Jehovah’s Witnesses have had a difficult time in Burgas, a city on the Black Sea. The locally elected municipal authorities, responding to public demonstrations against a Jehovah’s Witnesses prayer house being built so close to a public school, used their “public order” powers to stop construction of the prayer house. The case is pending before a court and being appealed to regional authorities. Also Article 21 of the new Confessions Act, which requires religious organizations to register at the national and then the local level, is viewed as likely to exacerbate such problems since certain localities like Burgas have been consistently hostile to non-traditional groups like the Jehovah’s Witnesses.

In some cases, local authorities used the lack of registration as a pretext for interference with some groups and harassed others. Some church groups circumvented the administrative obstacles created by a lack of registration by registering as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Technically it remained illegal for a church to conduct any religious activities through its NGO-registered organization, although the Government sometimes tacitly allowed such groups to conduct worship as long as they kept a very low profile. There were periodic reports of police using lack of local or national registration as a pretext to confiscate signboards and materials, detain or expel religious workers, and deny visas or residence permits to foreign-national missionaries.

The national Government on some occasions, but not systematically, has stopped local governments from enforcing restrictive municihe Black Sea coast. However, Protestant groups are dispersed more widely throughout the country. While clear statistics are not available, evangelical Protestant church groups have had particular success in attracting numerous converts from among the ethnic Roma minority, and these churches tend to be the most active denominations in predominantly Roma inhabited areas.

Although no exact data are available on attendance levels, most observers agree that evangelical Protestants tend to participate in religious services more frequently than other religious groups. Members of the country’s Catholic community also are regarded as more likely than members of other faiths to regularly attend religious services.

Missionaries are present in the country, including, for example, representatives of evangelical Protestant churches and more than 100 missionaries from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice for some non-Orthodox religious groups.

The Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the “traditional” religion. The Government provides financial support for the Eastern Orthodox Church, as well as for several other religious communities perceived as holding historic places in society, such as the Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Jewish faiths, which also are considered “traditional.” These groups generally benefit from a relatively high degree of governmental and societal tolerance.

A new law on religion, known as the Confessions Act, was approved by Parliament on December 22, 2002. It entered into force 1 week later, replacing an outdated religion law dating back to 1949. Religious and human rights groups have strongly criticized the law for the preferential treatment given to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and for provisions that appear to take sides in what many see as an internal Church conflict. Under the new law, all religious groups, with the exception of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, must register with the Sofia Municipal Court before they can practice their beliefs in public. The rather broad influence given to the Religious Denominations Directorate of the Council of Ministers, particularly regarding the Directorate’s exclusive right to give “expert opinions” to the Court regarding registration matters, also has been a cause of concern.

Several drafts of the new law were under consideration in late 2002. The Act was adopted before international legal experts and human rights groups had the opportunity to review the final draft to ensure it was consistent with international standards on religious freedom. Upon review following adoption of the law, legal experts and human rights groups found some provisions in the law to be ambiguous or even contradictory. A review prepared in early 2003 for the Council of Europe highlights that the provisions dealing with the process of registration neither specify the criteria establishing the basis on which the Court should grant registration, nor the grounds on which such registration can be withheld. The Act also fails to specify the consequences of failure to register as a religious community or outline any recourse if a competent court refuses to grant registration. Therefore, the actual impact of the new law will depend to a great extent on how the Act is implemented, including the Sofia Municipal Court’s practices regarding registration. There are reports that some groups have encountered undue delays with their re-registration. Since visas are contingent on re-registration, the Missionary Sisters of Charity and the Salesians reportedly have been denied visas.

For most registered religious groups there were no restrictions on attendance at religious services or on private religious instruction. Four Islamic schools (including a university-level Muslim divinity school), a Muslim cultural center, a multi-denominational Protestant seminary, university theological faculties, and religious primary schools operated freely. Bibles and other religious materials in the Bulgarian language were imported or printed freely, and Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish publications were published regularly.

Optional religious education courses are offered in state-run schools. Following the successful introduction of a program to provide optional Islamic education classes in primary schools in 2002 using a textbook proposed by the Chief Mufti and approved by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry agreed to assist with funding for such courses in 2004. The Chief Mufti’s office reports that in 2002 it funded more than 1,000 students participation in the pilot program. The Ministry announced that approximately 18,000 primary and secondary school students attend religion classes. Evangelical groups have expressed concern that other textbooks designed to be used in public schools for religious education are biased in favor of the Orthodox perspective.

The Government generally has encouraged greater religious tolerance since 1998 by seeking to promote greater understanding among different faiths.

Restrictions on Religious Freedom

The Government restricted religious freedom through a registration process that is selective, slow, and nontransparent. The Government prohibits the public practice of religion by groups that are not registered.

The split within the Bulgarian Orthodox Church between those who support Patriarch Maksim and those who view him as illegitimate because he was selected in 1971 under Communist rule to head that church led to tension between the groups and violence in July 2002. The schism, which began in 1992, continued despite attempts by the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha Government to heal the rift. While many Bulgarians viewed the Government as generally favoring the group headed by Maksim, the Government had stayed formally neutral regarding the leadership status of either Maksim’s “Holy Synod” or the so-called “alternative synod.” However, the new law recognizes Patriarch Maksim as the sole representative of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. It furthermore prohibits any group or person who has broken off from a registered religious group from using the same name or claiming any properties belonging to that group. Effectively, this prohibits members of the alternative synod from formally registering as the Bulgarian Orthodox Church or from claiming any of the Church property currently under its control.

On July 22, 2002, Stefan Kamberov, a 66-year-old priest associated with the alternative synod, was murdered near the St. Panteleimon Monastery near Dobrinshte. The two synods were in open conflict regarding the control of the monastery. Two suspects with connections to Maxim’s synod (including one priest) have been arrested in connection with the murder, but the case has not yet been brought to trial.

While the observance of religious freedom has improved for some nontraditional groups, other groups have faced official disfavor and been disadvantaged by the Government’s persistent refusal to grant registration. The legal requirement that groups whose activities have a religious element must register with the Sofia Municipal Court remained an obstacle to the activity of some religious groups, such as the Unification Church and the Sofia Church of Christ. Other church groups have successfully registered through the Court, but continued to face some discrimination and antipathy from many local governments.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses are legally registered, and have been recognized since 1998; however, there have been problems between the Jehovah’s Witnesses and some local authorities. The Jehovah’s Witnesses have had a difficult time in Burgas, a city on the Black Sea. The locally elected municipal authorities, responding to public demonstrations against a Jehovah’s Witnesses prayer house being built so close to a public school, used their “public order” powers to stop construction of the prayer house. The case is pending before a court and being appealed to regional authorities. Also Article 21 of the new Confessions Act, which requires religious organizations to register at the national and then the local level, is viewed as likely to exacerbate such problems since certain localities like Burgas have been consistently hostile to non-traditional groups like the Jehovah’s Witnesses.

In some cases, local authorities used the lack of registration as a pretext for interference with some groups and harassed others. Some church groups circumvented the administrative obstacles created by a lack of registration by registering as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Technically it remained illegal for a church to conduct any religious activities through its NGO-registered organization, although the Government sometimes tacitly allowed such groups to conduct worship as long as they kept a very low profile. There were periodic reports of police using lack of local or national registration as a pretext to confiscate signboards and materials, detain or expel religious workers, and deny visas or residence permits to foreign-national missionaries.

The national Government on some occasions, but not systematically, has stopped local governments from enforcing restrictive municipal government decisions, which appear to fall into a gray area of the law. Burgas, Plovdiv, and Stara Zagora are among the municipalities that have reported the greatest number of complaints of harassment of non-traditional religious groups. Some observers note with concern a tendency by certain municipalities to enact regulations preemptively that may be used to limit religious freedom if a perceived need arises.

These restrictive actions appear to be motivated by public intolerance. In November 2001, the city of Kurdzhali refused to issue the Christian Unity Biblical Association a permit for a planned public gathering. A spokesperson for the municipality reportedly justified this decision by stating that the evangelical association preached ideas that were “alien to local people.” In June the Municipal Council in Burgas passed a decision banning Jehovah’s Witnesses from building a prayer hall near a local public school. According to the Chairman of the Council, local residents and the school community protested the construction of the building. The Council’s decision was based on regulations granting it the authority to protect “public order and security.” Central government authorities have made no attempt to appeal the Council’s decision.

Although several municipalities such as Burgas, Plovdiv, Pleven, Gorna Oryahovitsa, and Stara Zagora previously had passed local ordinances that curtailed religious practices, often in contravention of the Constitution and international law, it does not appear that these have been strictly enforced. There were no reported incidents of street-level harassment of religious groups by the authorities during the period covered by this report.

A number of religious groups have complained that foreign missionaries and religious leaders experience difficulties in obtaining and renewing residence visas in the country; the issuance of residence visas appears to be subject to the whim of individual authorities. New amendments to the Law on Foreign Persons, which went into effect on May 1, 2001, have created problems for foreign national missionaries and religious workers. The revised law has no visa category that explicitly applies to missionaries or religious workers, and rules for other categories of temporary residence visa (such as self-employed or business-owner) have been tightened in ways that seem to make it more difficult for religious workers to qualify. This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that key government institutions have not yet developed implementing regulations or procedures to handle their new responsibilities under the law, despite the fact that the new law is in force. American evangelical missionaries in Stara Zagora reported confusion and delays in their visa application process from October 2001 through June 2002, including bureaucrats demanding unexpected fees or bribes. Missionaries therefore may have to limit the time and purpose of their visits to the 30 days accorded to tourists. Human rights groups also have protested the cancellation of residence status of several persons on undisclosed national security grounds, alleging that the action was a pretext for religious discrimination. In one case involving Ahmed Musa, a human rights attorney asserted that the expulsion was motivated by the desire of the police to seize the assets of a religious foundation; however, this allegation has not been confirmed.

The high school curriculum includes a course on religion initiated by the Ministry of Education. The original plan called for a world religion course that avoided endorsing any particular faith; however, members of other religions, especially ethnic Turkish Muslims, maintain that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church receives privileged coverage in the textbooks. The religion course is optional and is not available at all schools.

Following the successful introduction of optional Islamic education courses in 2002, and the expected development of additional courses in 2004, there has been some discussion of requiring pal government decisions, which appear to fall into a gray area of the law. Burgas, Plovdiv, and Stara Zagora are among the municipalities that have reported the greatest number of complaints of harassment of non-traditional religious groups. Some observers note with concern a tendency by certain municipalities to enact regulations preemptively that may be used to limit religious freedom if a perceived need arises.

These restrictive actions appear to be motivated by public intolerance. In November 2001, the city of Kurdzhali refused to issue the Christian Unity Biblical Association a permit for a planned public gathering. A spokesperson for the municipality reportedly justified this decision by stating that the evangelical association preached ideas that were “alien to local people.” In June the Municipal Council in Burgas passed a decision banning Jehovah’s Witnesses from building a prayer hall near a local public school. According to the Chairman of the Council, local residents and the school community protested the construction of the building. The Council’s decision was based on regulations granting it the authority to protect “public order and security.” Central government authorities have made no attempt to appeal the Council’s decision.

Although several municipalities such as Burgas, Plovdiv, Pleven, Gorna Oryahovitsa, and Stara Zagora previously had passed local ordinances that curtailed religious practices, often in contravention of the Constitution and international law, it does not appear that these have been strictly enforced. There were no reported incidents of street-level harassment of religious groups by the authorities during the period covered by this report.

A number of religious groups have complained that foreign missionaries and religious leaders experience difficulties in obtaining and renewing residence visas in the country; the issuance of residence visas appears to be subject to the whim of individual authorities. New amendments to the Law on Foreign Persons, which went into effect on May 1, 2001, have created problems for foreign national missionaries and religious workers. The revised law has no visa category that explicitly applies to missionaries or religious workers, and rules for other categories of temporary residence visa (such as self-employed or business-owner) have been tightened in ways that seem to make it more difficult for religious workers to qualify. This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that key government institutions have not yet developed implementing regulations or procedures to handle their new responsibilities under the law, despite the fact that the new law is in force. American evangelical missionaries in Stara Zagora reported confusion and delays in their visa application process from October 2001 through June 2002, including bureaucrats demanding unexpected fees or bribes. Missionaries therefore may have to limit the time and purpose of their visits to the 30 days accorded to tourists. Human rights groups also have protested the cancellation of residence status of several persons on undisclosed national security grounds, alleging that the action was a pretext for religious discrimination. In one case involving Ahmed Musa, a human rights attorney asserted that the expulsion was motivated by the desire of the police to seize the assets of a religious foundation; however, this allegation has not been confirmed.

The high school curriculum includes a course on religion initiated by the Ministry of Education. The original plan called for a world religion course that avoided endorsing any particular faith; however, members of other religions, especially ethnic Turkish Muslims, maintain that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church receives privileged coverage in the textbooks. The religion course is optional and is not available at all schools.

Following the successful introduction of optional Islamic education courses in 2002, and the expected development of additional courses in 2004, there has been some discussion of requiring all students to enroll in a course on religion, and students would be given the option of which course they wish to take.

The Department of Theology of Sofia University changed its rules requiring all students to present an Orthodox Church baptismal certificate and married students to present an Orthodox marriage certificate in order to enroll in the Department’s classes. This change has made it possible for non-Orthodox students to enroll in the Department.

The Government has abolished the construction and transportation battalions, to which ethnic and religious minorities previously were assigned in order to segregate them from the regular military forces. While the conscript troops of the military are integrated, the professional officer corps contains few members of ethnic or religious minority groups.

The failure of the Government to restitute certain confiscated properties remains a sore point in relations between various denominations and the State, and prevents these denominations from raising more revenue through the use or rental of such properties. There were no indications that the Government discriminated against members of any religious group in making restitution to previous owners of properties that were nationalized during the Communist period. However, NGOs and certain denominations claimed that a number of their properties confiscated under the Communist years have not been returned. For example, the Muslim community claims at least 17 properties around the country that have not been returned. The Orthodox Church, Catholic Church, Methodists, Adventists, and other groups also claim land or buildings in Sofia and other towns. Former Jewish properties mostly have been recovered over the last 10 years, with one exception in downtown Sofia that is pending before the court. A central problem facing all claimants is the need to demonstrate that the organization seeking restitution is the organization–or the legitimate successor of the organization–that owned the property prior to September 9, 1944. This is difficult because communist hostility to religion led some groups to hide assets or ownership, and because documents have been destroyed or lost over the years.

The law provides for alternative service for a 2-year period, more than twice as long as regular military service; universal conscripted military service is 9 months for most recruits, while university graduates serve just 6 months. Reportedly, several individuals are serving in an alternative civilian capacity in lieu of military service. Nonetheless, human rights observers complain that procedures for invoking this alternative as a conscientious objector are unclear. There were no new reports of incarcerations on religious grounds during the period covered by this report.

The Constitution prohibits the formation of political parties along religious lines.

There were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees.

Forced Religious Conversion

The Constitution prohibits forced religious conversion, and there were no reports of forced religious conversion or attempts at forced conversions, including of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the United States.

Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect for Religious Freedom

In October 2002, the Government decided to transfer ownership of the property at 9 Suborna Street to the Jewish organization “Shalom,” thus resolving one of two significant outstanding cases of Jewish community property restitution. Following the successful introduction of a program to provide optional Islamic education classes in primary schools in 2002, the Ministry of Education has agreed to assist with funding for such courses in 2004. The Chief Mufti’s office reports that in 2002 it funded more than 1,000 students participation in the pilot program and expect other denominations to develop similar programs in 200all students to enroll in a course on religion, and students would be given the option of which course they wish to take.

The Department of Theology of Sofia University changed its rules requiring all students to present an Orthodox Church baptismal certificate and married students to present an Orthodox marriage certificate in order to enroll in the Department’s classes. This change has made it possible for non-Orthodox students to enroll in the Department.

The Government has abolished the construction and transportation battalions, to which ethnic and religious minorities previously were assigned in order to segregate them from the regular military forces. While the conscript troops of the military are integrated, the professional officer corps contains few members of ethnic or religious minority groups.

The failure of the Government to restitute certain confiscated properties remains a sore point in relations between various denominations and the State, and prevents these denominations from raising more revenue through the use or rental of such properties. There were no indications that the Government discriminated against members of any religious group in making restitution to previous owners of properties that were nationalized during the Communist period. However, NGOs and certain denominations claimed that a number of their properties confiscated under the Communist years have not been returned. For example, the Muslim community claims at least 17 properties around the country that have not been returned. The Orthodox Church, Catholic Church, Methodists, Adventists, and other groups also claim land or buildings in Sofia and other towns. Former Jewish properties mostly have been recovered over the last 10 years, with one exception in downtown Sofia that is pending before the court. A central problem facing all claimants is the need to demonstrate that the organization seeking restitution is the organization–or the legitimate successor of the organization–that owned the property prior to September 9, 1944. This is difficult because communist hostility to religion led some groups to hide assets or ownership, and because documents have been destroyed or lost over the years.

The law provides for alternative service for a 2-year period, more than twice as long as regular military service; universal conscripted military service is 9 months for most recruits, while university graduates serve just 6 months. Reportedly, several individuals are serving in an alternative civilian capacity in lieu of military service. Nonetheless, human rights observers complain that procedures for invoking this alternative as a conscientious objector are unclear. There were n4.

It appears that some local ordinances that restricted religious freedom have not been enforced, and in some cases were suspended, due to pressure from the central Government.

Section III. Societal Attitudes

Relations between the major religious communities generally were amicable; however, discrimination, harassment, and general public intolerance of non-traditional religious groups (primarily newer evangelical Protestant groups) remained an intermittent problem. The number of reported incidents decreased during the period covered by this report. Strongly held suspicion of evangelical denominations among the populace is widespread and pervasive across the political spectrum and has resulted in discrimination. Often cloaked in a veneer of “patriotism,” mistrust of the religious beliefs of others is common. Such mainstream public pressure for the containment of “foreign religious sects” inevitably influences policymakers. Nevertheless, human rights observers agreed that such discrimination has gradually lessened over the last 5 years as society has appeared to become more accepting of at least some previously unfamiliar non-traditional religions.

There are disputes within the country’s Muslim community, in part along ethnic lines. Most Bulgarian Muslims, the majority of whom are ethnic Turks, practice a moderate form of Sunni Islam. Some are concerned that Muslims of Bulgarian ethnicity (“Pomaks”) and Roma Muslims, particularly those living in remote areas, are susceptible to “fundamentalist” (often referred to locally as “Arab” or “Wahabi”) influences associated with foreign funding of mosque construction and the training of imams in Arab countries. Opponents of the Chief Mufti within the Muslim community have accused him of failing to counteract or even fomenting the spread of Islamic extremism; however, these charges have not been confirmed.

Section IV. U.S. Government Policy

The U.S. Embassy regularly monitors religious freedom in ongoing contacts with government officials, clergy, lay leaders of minority communities, and NGOs. Embassy officers met with Orthodox clergy members (from both sides of the schism), the Chief Mufti and other senior Muslim leaders, with religious and lay leaders of the Jewish community, as well as with the leaders of numerous Protestant denominations. During the period covered by this report, the Embassy remained closely engaged with government and religious officials concerning the new law on religion, with various denominations regarding the restitution of properties, and with Muslim leaders regarding the war on terrorism. The Embassy maintaio new reports of incarcerations on religious grounds during the period covered by this report.

The Constitution prohibits the formation of political parties along religious lines.

There were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees.

Forced Religious Conversion

The Constitution prohibits forced religious conversion, and there were no reports of forced religious conversion or attempts at forced conversions, including of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the United States.

Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect for Religious Freedom

In October 2002, the Government decided to transfer ownership of the property at 9 Suborna Street to the Jewish organization “Shalom,” thus resolving one of two significant outstanding cases of Jewish community property restitution. Following the successful introduction of a program to provide optional Islamic education classes in primary schools in 2002, the Ministry of Education has agreed to assist with funding for such courses in 2004. The Chief Mufti’s office reports that in 2002 it funded more than 1,000 students participation in the pilot program and expect other denominations to develop similar programs in 2004.

It appears that some local ordinances that restricted religious freedom have not been enforced, and in some cases were suspended, due to pressure from the central Government.

Section III. Societal Attitudes

Relations between the major religious communities generally were amicable; however, discrimination, harassment, and general public intolerance of non-traditional religious groups (primarily newer evangelical Protestant groups) remained an intermittent problem. The number of reported incidents decreased during the period covered by this report. Strongly held suspicion of evangelical denominations among the populace is widespread and pervasive across the political spectrum and has resulted in discrimination. Often cloaked in a veneer of “patriotism,” mistrust of the religious beliefs of others is common. Such mainstream public pressure for the containment of “foreign religious sects” inevitably influences policymakers. Nevertheless, human rights observers agreed that such discrimination has gradually lessened over the last 5 years as society has appeared to become more accepting of at least some previously unfamiliar non-traditional religions.

There are disputes within the country’s Muslim community, in part along ethnic lines. Most Bulgarian Muslims, the majority of whom are ethnic Turks, practice a moderate form of Sunni Islam. Some are concerned that Muslims of Bulgarian ethnicity (“Pomaks”) and Roma Muslims, particularly those living in remote areas, are susceptible to “fundamentalist” (often referred to locally as “Arab” or “Wahabi”) influences associated with foreign funding of mosque construction and the training of imams in Arab countries. Opponents of the Chief Mufti within the Muslim community have accused him of failing to counteract or even fomenting the spread of Islamic extremism; however, these charges have not been confirmed.

Section IV. U.S. Government Policy

The U.S. Embassy regularly monitors religious freedom in ongoing contacts with government officials, clergy, lay leaders of minority communities, and NGOs. Embassy officers met with Orthodox clergy members (from both sides of the schism), the Chief Mufti and other senior Muslim leaders, with religious and lay leaders of the Jewish community, as well as with the leaders of numerous Protestant denominations. During the period covered by this report, the Embassy remained closely engaged with government and religious officials concerning the new law on religion, with various denominations regarding the restitution of properties, and with Muslim leaders regarding the war on terrorism. The Embassy maintained close contact with the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe regarding their views on the Confessions Act and a mutual goal of ensuring that international religious freedom standards are met.

ned close contact with the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe regarding their views on the Confessions Act and a mutual goal of ensuring that international religious freedom standards are met.